Abstract: Land value gains generated by urban renewal must be redistributed in a fair and reasonable manner to safeguard the public interest. From the perspective of public value capture, this paper examines the institutional design of Shenzhen’s land conveyance system for urban renewal and evaluates its effectiveness in returning land value gains to the public. The findings show that the system has performed well in quantitative terms, but its substantive effectiveness remains constrained by the poor quality of some conveyed sites, structural imbalances in land provision, mismatches between regional needs and assigned functions, and difficulties in coordinating land across renewal units. These shortcomings may also produce welfare losses during the value-creation process. The paper further identifies three institutional challenges: a universal capture mechanism is poorly suited to differentiated value-appreciation contexts; a single quantitative capture indicator cannot guarantee the quality of public value recycling; and project-bound capture instruments impose spatial limits on the reach of public benefits. On this basis, the paper proposes measures to refine value-capture instruments, strengthen quality control over public value recycling, and improve area-level coordination of land conveyance.