Abstract: Land redevelopment is a process of establishing a new contract on the basis of existing incomplete contracts. In essence, it is a new agreement on the allocation of land value-added gains reached by government, society, and market actors through complex bargaining. Drawing on an analysis of control rights in the administrative, economic, and social fields, and integrating the rent gap, the sequence in which control rights are exercised, and cost-benefit relations, this study constructs an analytical framework for the formation and selection of collective-land redevelopment models. It then analyzes the control-rights configuration of collective land in Dongguan in light of the institutional context and examines the decision-making logic of actors and the continuity of control rights through four implemented redevelopment cases. The study finds that government has priority in the sequence of exercising control rights and can flexibly create different redevelopment models through institutional design. The relationship between existing control rights and the exercise of control rights can be summarized as “strong/weak existing control rights - low/high exercise costs” and “strong/weak post-transaction control rights - high/low exercise benefits.” The choice of redevelopment models by multiple actors is therefore the outcome of bargaining based on the cost-benefit calculus of exercising, and selectively exercising, control rights. Finally, the paper discusses how different redevelopment models may be applied by considering the matching and continuity of control rights.