

The Logic and Optimization Strategies of Local Jurisdictional Authority in Territorial Spatial Planning

ZHU Jiren, ZHAO Guangying, TAN Yueyi, WANG Yiwei, SUN Yuxuan

Abstract: This study examines the allocation of governmental authority in territorial spatial planning at the municipal, county, and township levels. By analyzing the underlying logics of authorization, decentralization, and centralization, it proposes strategies for optimizing planning governance. The findings indicate that the authority structure of local governments and their planning departments at the municipal-county-township level reflects a logic of clear hierarchical authorization and coordinated responsibilities. However, problems characteristic of decentralization, including ambiguous authorization, overlapping authority, and misaligned responsibilities, persist to a notable degree. Conversely, the division of departmental authority exhibits a pronounced tendency toward centralization. The study concludes that improving the planning governance system depends on clarifying authority relationships within the planning framework, with the key task being to define the boundaries of planning authority at each level of government.

Keywords: territorial spatial planning; jurisdictional authority; logic; three determinations

After years of theoretical and practical exploration, territorial spatial master plans at the national, provincial, municipal, and county levels have largely been approved and have entered the stage of full implementation [1]. In the construction of the territorial spatial planning system under the integration of multiple plans, several stage-specific problems remain, including overloaded planning content [2-3], weak transmission effects [4-7], insufficient coordination with development planning [8-9], duplication in upper-level plans [10-11], and incomplete legislative, supervisory, and implementation mechanisms [12]. These problems are especially prominent in the municipal-county-township planning chain. They are a necessary part of the gradual maturation of the territorial spatial development and protection system, and also reflect a transitional contradiction in the clarification of planning authority. From the perspective of local governmental planning authority, examining the allocation of authority in legislation, compilation, approval, implementation, supervision, and inspection can help improve the modernization of the territorial spatial planning governance system and governance capacity at the institutional-design level.

In the Modern Chinese Dictionary, jurisdictional authority refers to the power to handle affairs. Governmental authority is the power, generated from governmental functions and authorized by law, to manage specific public affairs [13]. It includes both matters and power, reflects the unity of responsibility and authority, and is expressed through three necessary features: concrete administrative functions, legal authorization, and specific administrative power [14]. Governmental planning authority refers to the tasks and responsibilities that governments and their departments undertake according to statutory functions and duties, and it is realized through administrative power. In the construction of the territorial spatial planning system, scholars have carried out extensive research and practice on planning logic, spatial control systems, plan compilation, and management methods [15-21]. Studies on governmental planning authority also exist [8,22-23], but they mainly focus on the division of central-local authority and international experience. The internal division of planning authority within local governments, especially the authority allocation corresponding to local territorial spatial planning, has not yet been fully discussed [24-26].

The 2019 Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Establishing and Supervising the Implementation of the Territorial Spatial Planning System defines a five-level and three-type planning system. Local territorial spatial planning corresponds to the provincial, municipal, and county levels. Municipal and county territorial spatial master plans are both oriented to grassroots planning governance units and have

complete chains of governmental planning authority, while township territorial spatial planning is an extension of municipal and county governmental planning authority. For this reason, this study focuses on the authority allocation of implementation-oriented territorial spatial planning at the municipal, county, and township levels. It aims to clarify the relationships and contradictions of local governmental planning authority through legal and theoretical analysis, and to provide insights for improving the territorial spatial development and protection system.

1 Legal and Theoretical Logic of Local Government Planning Authority

Discussing local governmental planning authority from legal and theoretical perspectives helps identify the source of planning authority, analyze the logics of authorization, decentralization, and centralization, and coordinate the relationships and tensions embedded in local governmental planning authority.

1.1 Authorization

From a legal perspective, the authority of local governments in a unitary state derives from central authorization. China is widely understood in the literature as a unitary state [27-30]. In China's institutional design, local governments are executive bodies entrusted by the central government, higher-level organs, or authorized state organs. The central level has decisive power in confirming and dividing authority, and there is no absolute local inherent authority. According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, people's governments at and above the county level manage local affairs within their jurisdictions according to the authority prescribed by law, while township governments implement decisions and orders of the people's congress at the same level and of higher-level administrative organs. At the same time, the Constitution authorizes higher-level organs to enter local affairs. Although the Constitution states the principle of giving full play to local initiative and enthusiasm when dividing authority, Article 108 also provides that local governments at and above the county level lead the work of their departments and lower-level governments and may alter or revoke inappropriate decisions. The relationship between unified leadership, initiative, and enthusiasm embodies a balance between local initiative and defensive functions [31]. Thus, upper and lower levels exercise power within agreed boundaries without undermining the unity of the legal system; this is the meaning of authorization [32].

China has long had rules for dividing central-local authority, but the internal division of authority within local governments has remained relatively vague. In planning, documents such as the Measures for the Compilation of Urban Planning (2006), the Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Further Strengthening Urban Planning, Construction, and Management (2016), the Urban and Rural Planning Law, the Land Administration Law, the 2019 Opinions, and the Regulations for the Implementation of the Land Administration Law have all defined local governmental planning authority. Since the establishment of the new territorial spatial planning system, the principles for dividing planning authority have become clearer and more effective. The 2019 Opinions specifies the compilation priorities of territorial spatial master plans at each level, the compilation and approval authorities and procedures of master plans, special plans, and detailed plans, the principles of approval and supervision by the corresponding authority and of approving what is controlled, and the authorization of provincial governments in determining compilation and approval content and procedures. The 2019 Notice of the Ministry of Natural Resources on Comprehensively Carrying Out Territorial Spatial Planning further reiterates the principle of approving what is controlled and clarifies the review priorities for municipal territorial spatial master plans approved by provincial governments and by the State Council.

1.2 Decentralization and Centralization

Theoretically, decentralization has been a major global trend [33]. Especially after the 1990s, the shift from traditional government management to governance generated a tendency for decision-making and executive power to move downward [34-35]. Western scholars generally argue that strengthening local governmental authority helps coordinate relations among government, society, and the market and promotes diversified local development paths [36-37]. Except for intra-state unitary authority systems such as those in the United States [38], the United Kingdom [39], Japan [40], and Switzerland [41] have often built planning systems centered on local planning authority through decentralization, while France, the Netherlands, and South Korea have also strengthened local planning autonomy through varying forms of decentralization [42-45].

Since the Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Comprehensively Deepening Reform and the Plan for Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation of the State Council were issued in 2013, China has gradually established a framework of governmental functional transformation characterized by streamlining administration and delegating power. In administrative reform practice, most public-affairs governance powers show a decentralizing tendency, while a small number of public affairs display centralization; the internal mechanism of this differentiation deserves further study [46]. In essence, China's decentralization is not strict legal decentralization, but administrative and factual decentralization [47-48]. From the perspective of fiscal federalism, the choice between centralization and decentralization should follow the efficiency principle and balance public-service quality and efficiency [46], which is consistent with the logic of using operational efficiency to define the optimal boundary between centralization and decentralization of administrative matters in China. Moreover, centralized fields are often those closely related to economic lifelines and national security, and are realized through strengthened vertical management. Decentralized fields are concentrated in public services related to people's livelihood and socioeconomic governance, and are realized through strengthened non-vertical management, together with selective centralization to enhance regional coordination [49]. In planning practice, recent years have seen an upward concentration of decision-making power and downward movement of executive power in vertical power allocation, as well as centralization in horizontal power allocation [50] (Fig. 1).




图1 规划事权的分权和集权逻辑

Fig.1 The logic of decentralization and centralization in planning jurisdictional authority

Fig. 1 The logic of decentralization and centralization in planning authority.

2 Relationships of Local Government Planning Authority

Since the principle of approving what is controlled is explicit, the question of what local governments and their departments control should also be clear. Based on laws, regulations, rules, and normative documents in

planning and related fields, this study systematically reviews the authorized matters of governments and planning departments at the municipal, county, and township levels. It also draws on three-determinations plans of planning departments in 20 provinces and 37 prefecture-level cities, as well as township governmental functions, to examine the planning authority relations among municipal, county, and township governments.

2.1 Authorization Logic of Local Government Planning Authority

Local governmental planning authority is formed through hierarchical authorization. Municipal governments are mainly responsible for organizing the compilation, approval submission, implementation, supervision, and dynamic maintenance of municipal territorial spatial master plans and related special plans. County governments undertake more concrete implementation functions, including county master plans, detailed plans, land-use control, rural planning, project generation, and implementation management. Township governments are located at the end of the authority chain. Their planning authority is often expressed through participation in village planning, management of construction activities, land-use assistance, and grassroots governance. The authority of planning departments is derived from governmental functions and statutory duties, and it is embodied in the three-determinations documents that define functions, institutions, and staffing. This structure shows a relatively clear hierarchical authorization logic and a coordinated relationship between governments and their planning departments.

2.2 Decentralization Problems in Local Government Planning Authority

In practice, however, the decentralization of local governmental planning authority still involves unclear authorization, overlapping authority, and misaligned responsibilities. First, authorization is sometimes insufficiently explicit. Some three-determinations documents mention planning functions only in broad terms and do not clearly identify the legal basis, implementing subject, or specific boundary of each authority item. Second, there is overlap among authority items. Compilation, approval, implementation, supervision, and law-enforcement responsibilities may be repeatedly assigned to municipal departments, county departments, and township governments, creating duplicated governance. Third, authority and responsibility are sometimes misplaced. A township may bear front-line implementation and management responsibilities but lack corresponding statutory power, staffing, and technical capacity. County departments may be responsible for implementation but remain constrained by upper-level approval and departmental fragmentation. These problems weaken the effectiveness of planning implementation and make the authority chain less transparent.

文件层级	行政立法权	行政决策权	行政执行权	监督权	调处权	其他权力
市级	起草规范、标准；起草法规；制定监督检查法规政策	拟定发展规划和战略；划定“三区三线”；编制生态修复规划；编制文物保护相关规划；构建“三生空间”格局；拟定科技与信息化建设发展规划	负责国土空间用途转用工作；生态保护补偿；国土空间用途管制；土地整理复垦；矿山地质环境恢复治理；“三旧”改造；生态保护修复	监督检查法规执行情况	调处权属纠纷	建立土地价格体系
县级	制订监督检查法规政策；建立健全国土空间用途管制制度；拟订林长制相关制度	拟定发展规划和战略；划定“三区三线”；修建性详细规划的编制、修订、报批；编制国空生态修复规划；编制林业预算	负责国土空间用途转用工作；生态保护补偿；土地征收、储备；自然资源和规划审批；土地整理复垦；矿山地质环境恢复治理；生态保护修复；乡村建设项目选址；城市更新项目用地报批；审核城市更新方案	监督自然资源法律法规执行情况；监督实施村庄规划管理；监督占用耕地补偿制度执行情况	调处权属纠纷	建立土地价格体系
乡镇级		基本农田保护区的划定与管理	调查、统计、监测自然资源；地籍管理与调查；土地权属登记、发证、变更；临时用地审批；土地用途管制；建设用地预审工作			资源税费的收缴管理

来源：根据《中共中央、国务院关于加强国土空间规划编制审批实施监督考核工作意见》整理。

Tab. 1 Planning authority without clear authorization in the municipal, county, and township three-determinations documents.

3 Optimization Strategies for Planning Governance Based on Local Government Planning Authority

The preceding analysis suggests that the optimization of planning governance should start from the authority relationships within the planning system. Planning authority should be clarified in terms of supply and demand: on the supply side, legal and policy systems provide authorization, procedures, supervision, and administrative tools; on the demand side, local governments need adequate authority to perform planning compilation, approval coordination, implementation management, and supervision. The two sides must be matched through institutional design (Fig. 2).




图2 地方政府规划事权的供需关系

Fig.2 Supply and demand relationships of local government planning authority

Fig. 2 Supply and demand relationships of local government planning authority.

3.1 Clarifying Authority Relationships in Planning-System Governance

The improvement of the planning governance system depends on clarifying authority relationships in the planning system. In the improvement of legal systems such as the Territorial Spatial Planning Law and the Territorial Spatial Development and Protection Law, the administrative decision-making power related to ecological security, food security, environmental quality, resilience, and regional coordination can be gradually centralized. Authority related to people's livelihood, economic development, social equity, and cultural governance can be decentralized to municipal and county governments, while the administrative executive power of planning departments and township governments should be strengthened. First, the boundary of authorization should be clarified and a responsibility list should be prepared. On the basis of laws, regulations, rules, and implementation measures, the power and responsibility lists of planning departments at all levels should be formulated and dynamically updated. The legal basis, exercising subject, and specific scope of each authority item should be made clear, especially the authority differences between governments and departments in plan compilation and approval. Second, differentiated authority allocation should be implemented to avoid simple duplication. Based on the functional positioning and management needs of municipal, county, and township governments, authority items should be allocated differentially, and the core duties of higher and lower departments should be clarified. Third, a mechanism of matching authority and responsibility should be established to strengthen grassroots empowerment. Through legislation or normative documents, the authority and responsibility relations among governments and planning departments at all levels should be clarified, especially by assigning implementation authority to township and grassroots governments in line with their actual responsibilities and by establishing corresponding accountability and supervision mechanisms.

3.2 Clarifying the Boundaries of Planning Authority Among Municipal, County, and Township Governments

The key to improving the planning governance system is to clarify the boundaries of planning authority at each governmental level. On the one hand, the separation between compilation and approval should be promoted to optimize the allocation of planning authority and responsibility. This mechanism is central to clarifying planning

authority relationships and enhancing planning's scientific validity and authority. The decision-making power of planning should be separated from the technical-support function of plan compilation and linked through institutional arrangements. The decision-making power exercised by higher-level governments or municipal and county governments should focus on strategic and bottom-line matters, while the executive authority of planning departments at the same level should be specified through management rules and policy tools, thereby weakening the compilation burden of technical content and restoring the supporting role of planning results. On the other hand, authority should be separated accurately according to authority lists so that planning content can be focused. The essence of making plans leaner is to use a clear authority list of the government at the same level to determine the content that planning should handle. Matters that fall within higher-level authority should be transmitted through binding indicators, control lines, or policy requirements. Matters that belong to the authority of the same level should be translated into implementable planning content and administrative measures. Matters that require township participation should be linked with grassroots implementation, village planning, and construction management. Such a division can reduce the tendency to include all administrative issues in a single plan and can strengthen the clarity, operability, and accountability of planning.

4 Conclusion

The allocation of local governmental authority is an institutional foundation for the implementation of territorial spatial planning. This study shows that the authority structure of municipal, county, and township governments and their planning departments reflects a hierarchical authorization logic with relatively clear levels and coordinated responsibilities. At the same time, decentralization-related problems such as ambiguous authorization, overlapping authority, and misaligned responsibility remain, while departmental authority allocation shows a pronounced centralizing tendency. The optimization of the planning governance system should therefore focus on clarifying authority relationships within the planning framework, defining the boundaries of planning authority at different governmental levels, improving responsibility lists and supervision mechanisms, and matching planning authority with implementation capacity. Only in this way can territorial spatial planning move from system construction toward effective governance and provide stronger institutional support for territorial spatial development and protection.

Notes

(1) According to Article 30, paragraph 1, Chapter I of the Constitution, the administrative divisions of the People's Republic of China are as follows: the country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government; provinces and autonomous regions are divided into autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, and cities; counties and autonomous counties are divided into townships, ethnic townships, and towns. Paragraph 2 further states that municipalities directly under the central government and larger cities are divided into districts and counties, while autonomous prefectures are divided into counties, autonomous counties, and cities. The Legislation Law and the Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments distinguish cities with districts from cities without districts. Considering the complexity of China's municipal system, cities in practice include municipalities directly under the central government, cities with districts, and cities without districts. Cities with districts are generally prefecture-level administrative regions, while a small number of cities without districts are also prefecture-level cities for historical reasons, such as Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiayuguan, and Danzhou, also known as directly administered prefecture-level cities. The remaining cities without districts are county-level administrative regions. In legal terms, county-level and prefecture-level cities both belong to cities under provincial jurisdiction and are directly administered by provincial governments. The situation in which a prefecture-level city governs a

county-level city is essentially an entrusted-management model. Therefore, for ease of expression, this study treats cities with districts, autonomous prefectures, and prefecture-level regions as municipal-level units because they are consistent in local legislative power, people's congresses and standing committees, and local government organization. Municipalities directly under the central government are provincial-level administrative regions and are not included in municipal-level discussion. Districts, counties, cities without districts, and autonomous counties are included at the county level; towns, townships, and ethnic townships are included at the township level. Special administrative types such as regions, leagues, banners, autonomous banners, special districts, forest districts, subdistricts, sumu, ethnic sumu, and county-administered districts are not separately distinguished or discussed.

(2) This study focuses on municipal-county-township governments and their planning departments. Unless otherwise specified, planning authority refers to local governmental planning authority.

(3) State sovereignty is concentrated in the central government. Local governments are not inherent holders of power, but exist as branches or agents of the central government.

(4) Article 3, paragraph 4, Chapter I of the Constitution states that the division of functions and powers between central and local state organs follows the principle of giving full play to local initiative and enthusiasm under the unified leadership of the central authorities. Article 105, paragraph 1, Chapter III states that local people's governments at all levels are the executive organs of local state power organs and the local state administrative organs.

(5) Article 107, paragraph 1, Chapter III of the Constitution provides that local people's governments at and above the county level manage administrative work in their respective jurisdictions in such fields as the economy, education, science, culture, public health, sports, urban and rural construction, finance, civil affairs, public security, ethnic affairs, judicial administration, and family planning in accordance with legally prescribed authority. Paragraph 2 provides that township, ethnic-township, and town people's governments implement the resolutions of people's congresses at the same level and the decisions and orders of higher-level state administrative organs, and manage administrative work within their jurisdictions.

(6) According to the 2016 State Council Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Reform of the Division of Fiscal Authority and Expenditure Responsibilities between the Central and Local Governments (Guo Fa [2016] No. 49), a dynamic adjustment mechanism for central and local authority should be established. Central and local authority are relatively independent; both sides exercise power within agreed scopes without affecting the unity of the legal system.

(7) Decentralization includes three modes: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Deconcentration generally refers to transferring executive power, wholly or partly, to lower-level organs, and China's planning system reflects this mode of vertical management. Delegation transfers part of decision-making and executive power while setting requirements and policy conditions for execution. Examples include the United Kingdom's officer-delegation model, which delegates planning power to planning inspectors and urban development corporations, and Shenzhen's district-empowerment reform, which delegates land-use-right approval, urban renewal, and shantytown redevelopment functions to district-level entrusted organs. Devolution transfers all decision-making and executive power under a non-vertical management model, such as the State Council and Guangdong Province delegating provincial-level economic and social management powers to Shenzhen. In local planning practice, the exercise of planning and natural-resource department functions by branch offices is often mistaken for devolution, but it is essentially a delegation model in which administrative authority is exercised through entrusted power.

(8) From 2013 to 2020, the State Council cancelled or delegated 1,094 administrative-permission items in 16 batches.

(9) According to the Measures for Formulating and Implementing Three-Determinations Regulations, three determinations means determining functions, determining institutions, and determining staffing. In this study, data on some municipal, county, and township three-determinations plans are drawn from departmental responsibilities publicly released on government websites.

(10) The 2019 Guiding Opinions on Establishing a Nature-Reserve System with National Parks as the Main Body initiated the integration and consolidation of diverse, overlapping, ambiguously bounded, and institutionally fragmented protected areas, including scenic areas, forest parks, wetlands, nature reserves, and aquatic germplasm resource reserves, forming a nature-reserve system with national parks as the main body.

References

- [1] China National Radio. Territorial spatial master plans at the national, provincial, municipal, and county levels have largely been approved [EB/OL]. (2025-05-17) [2025-11-20]. https://china.cnr.cn/news/20250517/t20250517_527172608.shtml.
- [2] Zhao Guangying, Li Chen. Reform ideas for the spatial planning system from a legislative perspective [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2018(5): 37-45.
- [3] Li Yazhou, Liu Songling. Building a spatial planning system with clear authority: Japanese experience and implications [J]. Urban Planning International, 2020, 35(4): 81-88.
- [4] Tan Yinghui, Wang Wei, Jin Xiaobin. Bottleneck analysis, mechanism design, and path innovation for implementing municipal and county territorial spatial planning [J]. Planners, 2024, 40(6): 16-22.
- [5] Wang Xinzhe, Xue Haoying, Yao Kai. Key issues in compiling territorial spatial master plans: With a discussion on provincial territorial spatial planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2022(3): 50-56.
- [6] Zhu Jiren, Zhu Jieming. Constructing territorial spatial planning with the concept of social justice placed in advance: Theoretical reflection and governance pathways [J]. Planners, 2022, 38(10): 5-11.
- [7] Zhou Min, Lin Kaixuan, Wang Yong. Transmission system and path of territorial spatial planning based on full-chain governance [J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2022, 37(8): 1975-1987.
- [8] Xuan Xiaowei. Division of governmental authority in the multiple-plans-in-one reform [J]. Urban and Regional Planning Research, 2018, 10(1): 74-92.
- [9] Wang Xinzhe, Yang Yuhua, Zong Li, et al. Spatial transmission from master planning to detailed planning in territorial space: Practical difficulties, basic logic, and optimization measures [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2023(2): 96-102.
- [10] Zhan Meixu, Li Fei, Dong Bo, et al. Research on the implementation and operation mechanism of municipal territorial spatial planning [J]. Planners, 2023, 39(9): 32-39.
- [11] Zhao Min, Hao Jinwei. Paradoxes in urban master-plan practice and countermeasures [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2012(3): 1-9.
- [12] Zheng Yabin. Organizational mechanism for compiling Xiamen spatial planning oriented to multiple-plans-in-one [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2018(S1): 37-41.
- [13] Song Weigang. Conceptual discrimination and theoretical analysis of intergovernmental authority division [J]. Review of Economic Research, 2003(27): 44-48.
- [14] Deng Lingyun, Zeng Shanshan, Zhang Nan. Innovation of the spatial planning system from the perspective of governmental authority [J]. Urban Development Studies, 2016, 23(5): 24-30.
- [15] Wu Zhiqiang, Guo Renzhong, Zhang Bing, et al. Academic discussion on the systematic construction of the national spatial planning system [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2024(5): 1-11.

- [16] Deng Maoying. Exploration of spatial-governance planning from the perspective of megacity transformation: Practice of Guangzhou territorial spatial master planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2024(4): 51-57.
- [17] Zhou Niefan, Zhou Jianyun, Qi Dongjin, et al. Research on form-zoning expression of territorial spatial master-plan outcomes: A translation comparison based on Guangzhou territorial spatial master planning [J/OL]. City Planning Review, [2025-11-18]. <https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.2378.TU.20250625.0941.004>.
- [18] Sun Shiwen. Basic research on the implementation-supervision system of territorial spatial planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2024(2): 12-17.
- [19] Zhang Shangwu, Sima Xiao, Shi Xiaodong, et al. Academic discussion on the exploration and innovative practice of compiling territorial spatial detailed planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2023(2): 1-11.
- [20] Xiao Jinsong. Theoretical issues in the unified territorial spatial use-control system: From the perspective of land development rights [J]. City Planning Review, 2024, 48(11): 44-52.
- [21] Wu Zhiqiang. Five philosophical issues in territorial spatial planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2020(6): 7-10.
- [22] Zhu Jiang, Deng Mulin, Pan An. Multiple plans in one: Exploring the order of spatial planning and coordinated control [J]. City Planning Review, 2015, 39(1): 41-47.
- [23] Zhou Yixiao, Zhang Jialiang, Tan Zongbo. Formation, conflicts, and prospects of China's planning system: From the perspective of territorial spatial planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2020(6): 27-34.
- [24] Wang Xinzhe. The position and role of prefecture-level city territorial spatial master planning [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2019(4): 31-36.
- [25] Wang Xinzhe, Qian Hui, Liu Zhenyu. Positioning of county-level territorial spatial master planning from a governance perspective [J]. Urban Planning Forum, 2020(3): 65-72.
- [26] Lin Jian, Zhao Ye. National governance, territorial spatial planning, and central-local coordination: The development and trend of central-local relations in the evolution of the territorial spatial planning system [J]. City Planning Review, 2019, 43(9): 20-23.
- [27] Hu Jinguang, Han Dayuan. Chinese Constitutional Law [M]. Beijing: Law Press China, 2007.
- [28] Xu Chongde. Chinese Constitutional Law [M]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1996.
- [29] Zhang Qianfan. Introduction to Constitutional Law: Principles and Applications [M]. Beijing: Law Press China, 2004.
- [30] Garner. Political Science and Government: Government [M]. Translated by Lin Changheng. Beijing: Oriental Press, 2014.
- [31] Wang Jianxue. On the legal basis and constitutional structure of local governmental authority [J]. China Legal Science, 2017(4): 124-142.
- [32] Ye Bifeng. On local affairs [J]. Administrative Law Review, 2018(1): 16-27.
- [33] Pang Xiaomei, Zhou Jianyun, Qi Dongjin. Dynamic administrative model based on the characteristics of planning-permit authority [J]. Planners, 2016, 32(7): 23-28.
- [34] Houghton G, Allmendinger P. The New Spatial Planning: Territorial Management with Soft Spaces and Fuzzy Boundaries [M]. London: Routledge, 2010.
- [35] Nadin V, Maldonado A M F. Comparative analysis of territorial governance and spatial planning systems in Europe [R]. Final Report Submitted to ESPON, 2018. www.espon.eu/planning-systems.
- [36] Rodriguez-Pose A, Gill N. Is there a global link between regional disparities and devolution [J]? Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 2004, 36(12): 2097-2117.
- [37] Jones M, Goodwin M. State modernization, devolution and economic governance: An introduction and guide to debate [J]. Regional Studies, 2005, 39(4): 397-404.

- [38] Healey P, Khakee A. European developments in strategic spatial planning [J]. *European Planning Studies*, 1999, 7(3): 339-355.
- [39] Cai Yumei, Wang Guoli, Lu Ying, et al. Models and implications of international spatial planning systems [J]. *Natural Resource Economics of China*, 2014, 27(6): 67-72.
- [40] Local Decentralization Research Subcommittee of the City Planning Institute of Japan. *Local Decentralization of Urban Planning: Practice of Community Development* [M]. Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha, 1999.
- [41] Zhang Qin. Clear authority, clear subjects, and implemented responsibilities: Implications of the Swiss urban-rural planning system [J]. *Urban Planning International*, 2009, 24(S1): 287-290.
- [42] Booth P. Planning and the culture of governance: Local institutions and reform in France [J]. *European Planning Studies*, 2009, 17(5): 677-695.
- [43] Janssen-Jansen L B, Woltjer J. British discretion in Dutch planning: Establishing a comparative perspective for regional planning and local development in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom [J]. *Land Use Policy*, 2010, 27(3): 906-916.
- [44] Kimbom I. A study on the autonomy of planning in local government [J]. *Journal of Local Government Studies*, 2017, 29(4): 1-22.
- [45] Oh J. A comparative legal study on the planning autonomy of local government between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Korea [J]. *Local Government Law Journal*, 2016, 16(1): 3-29.
- [46] Kang Dahua, Hu Xia'e. The internal logic and historical evolution of centralization and decentralization in Chinese-style environmental governance [J]. *Exploration*, 2021(5): 55-66.
- [47] Yao Dongmin, Zhang Shiqi. How to delegate power optimally: The optimal boundary between centralization and decentralization of administrative matters [J]. *Finance and Economics Research*, 2017, 43(4): 41-54.
- [48] Gong Feng, Lei Xin. Quantitative measurement of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization [J]. *Statistical Research*, 2010, 27(10): 47-55.
- [49] Cao Zhenghan, Nie Jing. National security and the logic of selective centralization under central vertical management [J]. *Academic Monthly*, 2024, 56(6): 75-88.
- [50] Pei Zhen. Legal thinking on relatively centralized administrative power in urban management [J]. *Journal of Shanghai Urban Management College*, 2005(1): 52-55.

AI-assisted translation